The IAT shows no evidence for Kandinsky's color-shape associations by Alexis D. J. Makin & Sophie M. Wuerger
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 11 September 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00616
The IAT shows no evidence for Kandinsky’s color-shape
associations
Alexis D. J. Makin* and Sophie M. Wuerger
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Edited by:
Galina Paramei, Liverpool Hope
University, UK
Reviewed by:
David Bimler, Massey University,
New Zealand
Rob Van Lier, Donders Institute,
Netherlands
Johannes Zanker, University of
London, UK
*Correspondence:
Alexis D. J. Makin, Department of
Experimental Psychology, University
of Liverpool, Eleanor Rathbone
Building, L69 7ZA Liverpool, UK
e-mail: alexis.makin@liverpool.ac.uk
In the early twentieth century, the Bauhaus revolutionized art and design by using simple
colors and forms. Wassily Kandinsky was especially interested in the relationship of these
two visual attributes and postulated a fundamental correspondence between color and
form: yellow triangle, red square and blue circle. Subsequent empirical studies used
preference judgments to test Kandinsky’s original color-form combinations, usually yielding
inconsistent results. We have set out to test the validity of these postulated associations
by using the Implicit Association Test. Participants pressed one of two buttons on each
trial. On some trials they classified shapes (e.g., circle or triangle). On interleaved trials
they classified colors (e.g., blue or yellow). Response times should theoretically be faster
when the button mapping follows Kandinsky’s associations: For example, when the left
key is used to report blue or circle and the right is used for yellow and triangle, than
when the response mapping is the opposite of this (blue or triangle, yellow or circle).
Our findings suggest that there is no implicit association between the original color-form
combinations. Of the three combinations we tested, there was only a marginal effect
in one case. It can be concluded that the IAT does not support Kandinsky’s postulated
color-form associations, and that these are probably not a universal property of the visual
system.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the links
between art and visual perception, with new specialized journals
and conferences. It is recognized that artists might be experts at
exploiting the visual system; with special sensitivity to its con-
straints and parameters, and that vision scientists might learn
something by studying paintings in detail (Ramachandran and
Hirstein, 1999; Zeki, 2002; Van de Cruys and Wagemans, 2011;
Shimamura, 2012).
Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944) was an influential Russian
painter. As his career progressed, Kandinsky produced increas-
ingly abstract images, and for a period from 1922–1933 he
taught at the famous Bauhaus school in Germany, which cel-
ebrated simple colors and forms. Kandinsky was a theorist as
well as an artist, and he derived profound, spiritual mean-
ing from aesthetic experiences. One of Kandinsky’s ideas was
that there are certain fundamental associations between col-
ors and shapes (Kandinsky, 1912): he proposed Yellow-Triangle,
Blue-Circle, and Red-Square. These associations were formu-
lated introspectively, however, he did conduct his own survey
at the Bauhaus in 1923 by distributing questionnaires to his
professorial colleagues and students, and found that many of
his colleagues agreed with his associations; notable exceptions
were his contemporaries, Klee and Schlemmer, who favored
different form-color combinations (Duechting, 1996). In fact,
Kandinsky had already embarked upon a similar attempt to iden-
tify color form associations while still in Russia with the aim
to provide the scientific underpinning for his own intuitions
(Poling, 1984).
Recently, the idea of systematic color-form associations
has become known as correspondence theory (Jacobsen, 2002;
Kharkhurin, 2012). It probably crystallized somewhat after
Kandinsky’s death, becoming more tightly associated with the
Bauhaus through various historical accidents. For example, a
famous poster for the Bauhaus exhibition in Stuttgart, 1968,
designed byHerbert Bayer, showed the yellow triangle, red square,
and blue circle (Jacobsen and Wolsdorff, 2007).
After Kandinsky’s original survey in 1923, evidence for corre-
spondence theory has been limited. Jacobsen (2002) administered
a modified version of Kandinsky’s questionnaire to a sample of
non-artist university students, half of whom were asked to choose
combinations of colors and shapes (mere correspondence), and
half were asked which combinations they found aesthetically
pleasing (aesthetic correspondence). It was found that pragmatic
associations influenced participant’s choices, for example, they
typically paired red with triangle because of association with
traffic signs, and yellow with circle because this looked like the
sun. Moreover, these subjects actually disliked the combinations
devised by Kandinsky compared to other options. More recently,
Jacobsen and Wolsdorff (2007) found that a sample of art experts
had their own color-form combination preferences, but these
were again in disagreement with correspondence theory.
Most recently, Albertazzi et al. (2013) asked participants to
choose the color that they felt naturally went with each of 12
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shapes, including some 3D shapes. Participants were explicitly
told to avoid associations from memory, of the type reported by
Jacobsen (2002). If people have no systematic color form asso-
ciations, then all combinations would appear equally. However,
some combinations were chosen significantly more often than
others. The results were partially in agreement with Kandinsky’s
correspondence theory (Yellow and Triangle, Red and Square),
but there was little evidence for blue and circle associations, and
several other associations, not discussed by Kandinsky, were also
reported.
The topic has also been explored by Holmes and Zanker
(2008) who used an innovative oculomotor evolutionary algo-
rithmmethod. Virtual “genes” controlled stimulus characteristics
such as color and shape. For example, for one member of the
starting population, the color gene might be set to yellow, and
the shape gene set to square, so the individual stimulus would
be a yellow square. For another stimulus the color and shape
genes would code a different combination. At the beginning of the
experiment, the computer generated a “population” of many such
stimuli, with randomly chosen virtual genes. On each trial, a sub-
set of the starting population would be shown on the screen, and
the participants looked for the ones they like most. Genes were
assigned a fitness score based on feedback from an eye tracker.
After a certain number of trials, the stimuli entered a competitive
tournament, and only the stronger combinations were passed on
to the next generation. Over the trials, stimuli evolved to become
more like those that best attract participant’s gaze. However, while
consistent preferences were found within each individual, no
systematic color-form combinations emerged across observers.
Kandinsky may have had an intriguing condition known
as synesthesia, where multimodal connections create idiosyn-
cratic, additional perceptual experiences. For example, in color-
grapheme synesthetes, who have been best studied, the letter E
might be perceived as if it is always written in red ink. Synesthesia
does not reflect trivial associations and beliefs: grapheme-color
synesthetes show improved letter detection performance in visual
search tasks, and, in some subjects, the color-sensitive brain area
V4 is activated by presentation of black and white graphemes
(Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005). Many theorists cited above
have suggested that Kandinsky’s synesthesia may have inspired
correspondence theory.
Given the research to date, it is entirely possible that cor-
respondence theory says something about Kandinsky’s personal
artistic elaborations or the socially constructed aesthetics of
the Bauhaus movement, but says nothing about the architec-
ture of the average person’s visual system. However, Hubbard
and Ramachandran (2005) suggest that mechanisms present in
synesthetes may be present to a lesser degree in non-synesthetes,
and this could account for the “conceptual rightness” of cer-
tain, widely held multisensory mappings, such as the Bouba–Kiki
effect, where jagged or bulbous visual shapes seem to “go” with
certain sounds (in this case, “Bouba” with rounded shapes, “Kiki”
with spiky shapes). Moreover, while synesthetic associations are
strikingly idiosyncratic, most people sense the Bouba–Kiki asso-
ciations. Correspondence theory could reflect Kandinsky’s intu-
ition into some of these sub-clinical, quasi-synesthetic pairings,
which, like the Bouba–Kiki effect, are near-universal.
It is possible that these quasi-synesthetic associations might
not be explicitly recognized, but affect perceptual judgments
nevertheless. Following this reasoning, Kharkhurin (2012) evalu-
ated correspondence theory with an implicit priming experiment.
Participants were shown a colored screen for 1 s, then a shape,
which they had to classify as quickly as possible as triangle, square
or circle. The hypothesis was that people would classify the shape
quicker on congruent trials, where the prime color was associated
with the shape according to correspondence theory. In a second
experiment, this was reversed, and shapes were used as a prime
before color classification. Neither experiment found any facilita-
tion of reaction time in the congruent trials, so this study failed to
provide any empirical support for correspondence theory using
implicit priming techniques.
Kharkhurin’s (2012) work was based on a priming paradigm,
which, although valid and potentially informative, may not
have been optimized for detecting associations between two
visual dimensions. In Kharkhurin’s study, the primes were task-
irrelevant, and could potentially be ignored completely, while the
targets were classified very easily. Recent work on affective prim-
ing and symmetry has found this technique to be much weaker
than different paradigms where participants are forced to clas-
sify all stimuli (Bertamini et al., 2013a). In the current work, we
test correspondence theory using the Implicit Association Test
(IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2007), which has been
used in thousands of experiments, often revealing associations
between dimensions which people are either explicitly unaware
of, or even explicitly reject. Recently, the IAT has been used to
answer various questions in empirical aesthetics (Gattol et al.,
2011; Mastandrea et al., 2011; Makin et al., 2012a,b; Bertamini
et al., 2013b). Importantly, the IAT procedure requires partic-
ipants to classify all stimuli. Furthermore, it was specifically
designed to probe associations between stimulus pairs, and it has
been subjected to extensive methodological scrutiny (Nosek et al.,
2007).
The best way to describe the IAT is through example. In one
of the best-known IAT experiments, participants were given two
buttons, which were used to classify four stimulus categories
(Greenwald et al., 1998). On some trials they saw pictures of
either flowers or insects, and had to press one button for flower
and the other button for insect. On interleaved trials, they saw
either positive words (e.g., LOVE) or negative words (e.g., HATE).
They had to press one button for positive, and the other for neg-
ative. In congruent blocks, the same button was used to report a
flower or positive word, and the other was used to report insect
or negative word. In incongruent blocks, the response mapping
was reversed (so one button was used to report flower and neg-
ative, the other was used to report insect and positive). Because
people usually associate flowers with other positive things and
insects with negative things, the task was much harder in the
incongruent block, and reaction times were therefore longer. The
existence of an RT difference between congruent and incongru-
ent blocks can be taken as evidence for an implicit association
between the stimulus pairs. In this example, the implicit associ-
ations measured by the IAT were in agreement with the explic-
itly held attitudes of the participants, who preferred flowers to
insects.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 616 | 2
Makin and Wuerger Color-form associations
In another experiment, Greenwald et al. (1998) used the IAT
to reveal implicit racial prejudices in participants who were not
overtly racist. White participants were quicker to respond in con-
gruent blocks, where white faces and positive words were reported
with the same key, and black faces and negative words were
reported with the other key, then in incongruent blocks, where
the responsemapping was reversed (white and negative, black and
positive). Given that the IAT is sensitive to hidden or unconscious
associations, it might reveal color-form correspondences that are
not explicitly acknowledged.
In this work we presented 36 participants with three sep-
arate IAT experiments in a within-subjects design (see Gattol
et al., 2011 for another example of this “multidimensional” IAT
approach). Each IAT experiment compared two colors and two
shapes. In the congruent blocks, color-form mapping was in
line with Kandinsky’s correspondence theory (yellow-triangle,
blue-circle, red-square). Let’s consider IAT 1 for example: in the
congruent blocks participants had to press the left key for blue or
circle, and the right key for yellow or triangle (both Kandinsky’s
correspondences). In the incongruent blocks, response map-
ping was the opposite of correspondence theory, so the left key
would be used for blue or triangle and the right key would
be used for yellow or circle (Opposite of Kandinsky’s corre-
spondences). Tables 1 and 2 show the structure of IAT 1 in
more detail. The three IAT experiments cover every combina-
tion of color and shape proposed by correspondence theory
(Table 3).
Table 1 | Order of blocks and response mappings for participants who
did congruent trials first (example from IAT 1).
Block N trials Left key Right key
1 Training 1 20 Circle Triangle
2 Training 2 20 Blue Yellow
3 Congruent 1 20 Circle or Blue Triangle or Yellow
4 Congruent 2 40 Circle or Blue Triangle or Yellow
5 Training 3 20 Triangle Circle
6 Training 4 20 Triangle Circle
7 Incongruent 1 20 Triangle or Blue Circle or Yellow
8 Incongruent 2 40 Triangle or Blue Circle or Yellow
Table 2 | Order of blocks and response mappings for participants who
did incongruent trials first (example from IAT 1).
Block N trials Left key Right key
1 Training 1 20 Triangle Circle
2 Training 2 20 Blue Yellow
3 Incongruent 1 20 Triangle or Blue Circle or Yellow
4 Incongruent 2 40 Triangle or Blue Circle or Yellow
5 Training 3 20 Circle Triangle
6 Training 4 20 Circle Triangle
7 Congruent 1 20 Circle or Blue Triangle or Yellow
8 Congruent 2 40 Circle or Blue Triangle or Yellow
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-six participants were involved (age 18–45, 11 male, 6 left
handed).Most were involved with undergraduate or postgraduate
study at the University of Liverpool. All had normal or corrected
to-normal vision. The male participants were checked for color
blindness using the 1966 Ishihara plates (Ishihara, 1917), and
none were aware of the Kandinsky color form correspondence
theory (or were at least unaware of the exact combinations he
proposed).
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Stimuli were presented at ∼57 cm on a 1280 × 1024 pixel CRT
monitor, with a refresh rate of 60Hz. Stimuli were generated
using open source Psychopy software (Peirce, 2007). Participants
entered responses using the left [A] and right [L] keys of a
standard computer keyboard. The three shapes were white line
drawings on a black background. The circle was 6.3◦ in diame-
ter, the square was 6.3 × 6.3◦, and the triangle was 6.3◦ tall, and
6.3◦ wide, always presented with the same upwards orientation.
Color patches were ∼20◦ wide (Gaussian-modulated full screen,
Figure 1). Since there are no precise records of the colors used
by Kandinsky, we used a set of primary colors (red, yellow, blue)
close to unique hues as judged by a color-normal experienced
observer (Wuerger et al., 2005; Wuerger, 2013). The CIE coordi-
nates and the luminance of the colored Gaussian patches were as
follows: yellow x = 0.406; y = 0.512; luminance= 59 cd/m2; red:
x = 0.628; y = 0.331; luminance = 14 cd/m2; blue: x = 0.152;
y = 0.071; luminance= 8 cd/m2. Example stimuli from IAT 1 are
shown in Figure 1.
PROCEDURE
Each participant completed 3 IAT experiments, which took about
7min each. The structure of a single IAT experiment was based
on the recommendations of Nosek et al. (2007). There were 8-
blocks in total. Half the participants did the congruent blocks
first. For these participants, the IAT 1 would have run as shown
in Table 1. The first block was a training block, where partic-
ipants discriminated shape only (e.g., left for circle, right for
triangle). The second block was another training block, where
participants discriminated color only (e.g., left button for blue,
right for yellow). The third and fourth congruent blocks combined
color and shape discrimination, and the response mapping fitted
Kandinsky’s theory (e.g., left for circle or blue, right for triangle or
Table 3 | The response mappings in our 3 IAT experiments.
IAT 1 IAT 2 IAT 3
Left key Right key Left key Right key Left key Right key
Congruent
blocks
Circle Triangle Circle Square Square Triangle
Blue Yellow Blue Red Red Yellow
Incongruent
block
Triangle Circle Square Circle Triangle Square
Blue Yellow Blue Red Red Yellow
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FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli used in the current experiment.
yellow). Next two further training blocks were given, where par-
ticipants had to relearn the key mapping for shapes (e.g., left but-
ton for triangle, right for circle). Finally, two incongruent blocks
were presented, where the response mapping was the opposite
of Kandinsky’s correspondence theory (e.g., left for triangle or
blue, right for circle or yellow). The other participants did the
incongruent block first, and the training blocks were rearranged
accordingly (Table 2). In each block, the trials were presented in
a novel random order for each participant. The order in which
participants did the three IAT experiments, and the number of
participants doing congruent or incongruent blocks first was
counterbalanced.
All blocks were preceded by appropriate instructions inform-
ing participants of the stimuli and response requirements. When
stimuli were presented, cue words reminded participants which
keys should be used to report their answers. For example, when a
shape appeared in first training block of IAT 1, the words “circle”
and “triangle” appeared on the left and right sides of the screen.
When participants pressed the wrong button, the word “Wrong”
appeared centrally in red, and remained until the correct key was
pressed.
ANALYSIS
Kandinsky’s correspondence theory would be supported by faster
reaction times in congruent blocks than incongruent blocks. We
processed the data according to the recommendations of Nosek
et al. (2007), which are widely used in the IAT literature (e.g.,
Gattol et al., 2011). Training blocks were excluded from anal-
ysis. Trials where participants pressed the wrong button were
also excluded (6%). For each participant and experiment, the
following data processing steps were taken.
(1) We then obtained the mean RT in blocks 3,4,7, and 8.
(2) We computed the difference in mean RT between blocks 3
and 7, and the difference 4 and 8.
(3) We the obtained the standard deviation of response times in
blocks 3 and 7. We then divided the difference in mean RT
between 3 and 7 by this standard deviation, giving a D score.
(4) We repeated this procedure for blocks 4 and 8, to give another
D score.
(5) D scores from steps 3 and 4 were averaged, to give a single D
score for that participant and IAT.
The D score is the difference between incongruent and congru-
ent blocks in standard deviation units. A positive value means
the hypothesis was supported, and negative value means that
the participant associates stimuli in the opposite way to that
predicted. We got three D scores from each participant: one
from each IAT experiment in Table 3. We used one-sample
t-tests to explore whether D scores across participants were
significantly greater than zero. These variables in this analysis
were normally distributed according to the Shapiro-Wilk test
(p > 0.219).
RESULTS
Participants completed three IAT experiments, each compar-
ing a pair of Kandinsky’s color form correspondences. In the
congruent blocks, response mapping was in accordance with
the theory, while in the incongruent blocks, response map-
ping was the opposite of correspondence theory. Faster reac-
tion times in the congruent blocks would support the the-
ory. We found limited evidence for this in our IAT exper-
iments. As shown in Figure 2, D scores were normally dis-
tributed around zero in IAT1 [t(35) = −1.301, p = 0.202] and
IAT 2 [t(35) =< 1, N.S]. However, In IAT 3 there was a bor-
derline effect in the expected direction in IAT 3 [t(35) = 2.020,
p = 0.051].
Repeated measures ANOVA tested whether there was a dif-
ference in the D scores between the three IAT experiments,
and whether this interacted with the between-subjects factors of
experiment order (the order which the three IAT experiments
were presented) and block order (congruent block first or sec-
ond). There was a borderline significant effect of IAT [F(2, 60) =
3.141, p = 0.050], because of the slightly larger D score in IAT
3, described above. There were no interactions involving exper-
iment order [F(4, 60) < 1, N.S], or block order [F(2, 60) = 1.744,
p = 0.183].
There are various approaches to IAT analysis. Some researchers
do not include the first blocks of congruent and incongruent tri-
als (Blocks 3 and 7 in Table 1) and analyze D scores from the
longer second blocks only (Blocks 4 and 8). With this approach,
the effect in IAT3 was again borderline significant [t(35) = 1.969,
p = 0.057].
Another approach is to simply compare mean response time
in congruent and incongruent blocks (without standardization
to D scores). In our study, this approach found no effects in
IAT1 [609 vs. 588ms. t(35) = −1.241, p = 0.223] or IAT2 [630
vs. 601ms. t(35) = −1.502, p = 0.142], [575ms. in the congru-
ent block vs. 621ms. in the incongruent block, t(35) = 2.498,
p = 0.017].
We next analyzed response times with mixed ANOVA with
two within-subject factors [experiment (IAT1, IAT2, or IAT3) ×
block (congruent or incongruent)] and two between subject fac-
tors (3 experiment order × 2 block order). Correspondence
theory predicts a main effect of block, resulting from uniform
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FIGURE 2 | Results of three IAT experiments designed to measure
color-form correspondence theory. Positive D scores reflect faster
performance in congruent blocks. The Histogram shows the number of
participants with D scores within a given range. In IATs 1 and 2 the 36 D
scores were normally distributed around zero. In IAT 3 there was a
marginally significant shift the right, meaning that on average, participants
associated yellow with triangle and red with square compared to the
opposite, in line with Kandinsky’s theory.
faster responses in the congruent blocks. There was no evidence
for this [F(1, 30) < 1, N.S]. Furthermore, there was no overall
response time difference between the three IAT experiments
[F(1, 61, 48.26) < 1, N.S.]. There was, however, an experiment ×
congruence interaction [F(2, 60) = 5.517, p = 0.006]. This was
because of the unique effect of congruence in IAT3, mentioned
above. There was also an IAT × experiment order interaction
[F(3, 22, 48.26) = 3.654, p = 0.017], partly because participants
tended to take longer to produce responses in their first IAT than
the next two. There were no other effects or interactions [next
largest F(1, 30) = 1.777, p = 0.193].
Finally, we predicted that participants should make fewer
errors in the congruent blocks. There was no difference in
error rates between congruent and incongruent blocks in IAT1
[t(35) < 1, N.S.] or IAT2 [t(35) < 1, N.S.]. However, responses
were more accurate in the congruent blocks of IAT3 [t(35) =
3.431, p = 0.002]. So, while there was some marginal support
for Kandinsky’s correspondence theory from IAT 3, we acknowl-
edge most evidence for this effect would disappear completely if
we employed correction for multiple comparisons, so we do not
consider it instructive without replication.
DISCUSSION
Our series of three IAT experiments provided no support
for Kandinsky’s color form correspondence theory. Participants
completed three IAT experiments; each designed to compare
one pair of color-shape associations with the opposite. In
IATs 1 and 2, Reaction times were comparable in congru-
ent and incongruent blocks, suggesting no special associa-
tions between particular combinations. These results are thus
in agreement with those of Kharkhurin (2012) and Holmes
and Zanker (2008), who also found no evidence for corre-
spondence theory using different implicit procedures. In IAT
3, there was a marginally significant effect in the expected
direction, suggesting that participant’s associate triangle with
yellow and square with red, as Kandinsky would have pre-
dicted. However, this effect was not strong, and would require
replication.
Our IAT experiments did not test whether people have prefer-
ence for yellow triangles, red squares and blue circles over other
color-shape pairings. However, we think these putative color
shape associations would be theoretically interesting even without
aesthetic preferences. For one thing, a clear, positive result in our
IAT experiments would suggest that Kandinsky had intuitively
recognized an obscure and unexplained property of the visual sys-
tem, which would require further research. Our null results have
different implications: We conclude that Kandinsky’s correspon-
dence theory has little to say about the architecture of the typical
visual system, and must have other origins. Leading thinkers in
scientific aesthetics are probably justified when they claim that
artists possess a unique kind of knowledge about human vision
(e.g., Zeki, 2002; Van de Cruys and Wagemans, 2011), however,
correspondence theory is probably not an example of this special
insight.
It is very unlikely that the null results reported here can be
attributed to low power. There were 36 participants, a much
larger sample size than used in other IAT experiments in aes-
thetic science. For example, Makin et al. (2012a) used the
IAT to detect an implicit preference for symmetrical over ran-
dom patterns with 12 subjects, and replicated this in other
experiments with just 6 subjects. The mean D scores in these
experiments were around 0.5, whereas the highest D score
here was 0.12. Further examples from diverse fields allow this
effect size to be seen in context: Gattol et al. (2011) found D
scores ranging around 0.2–0.4 for associations between differ-
ent car brands and dimensions such as “aggressive-peacefulness”
and “conventional-innovative,” while Dasgupta et al. (2009)
reported D scores of at least 0.5 in a series of IATs mea-
suring implicit attitudes toward social in-groups and out-
groups. These are all higher than the largest D score found in
IAT3.
Moreover, we conducted three IAT experiments, and did
not correct for multiple comparisons. This would increase the
chances of a false positive, but we still only found a borderline
effect in one of our three experiments. Finally, there was an asym-
metry in the design of this experiment, which can be seen in
Figure 2: Across the three IATs, a shape was twice as likely to share
a button with the color proposed by correspondence theory as any
other color (for example, a participant would be presented with
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two experiments where yellow and triangle were reported with the
same button, but only a single experiment where blue and triangle
or red triangle shared a button). If anything, this design feature
would produce false positives in favor or correspondence theory,
which we did not find. This data, in conjunction with previous
work, seems to rule out Kandinsky’s correspondence theory in
any strong form, so we think Kandinsky’s theory is very unlikely
to constitute an insight into the architecture of the average visual
system.
Jacobsen (2002) reported different color-form associations to
Kandinsky, which seemed to be based on pragmatic associations.
For example, his participants paired yellow with circle, because
the sun is a yellow circle. We did not find any further evidence
for this with our IAT experiments. However, Jacobsen (2002)
used a modified version of Kandinsky’s questionnaire, which
required people to choose preferred particular color-shape com-
binations from the available options. Perhaps these pragmatic
associations only exist when people are forced to make explicit,
verbal judgments? Moreover, a very recent study using an explicit
matching task (Albertazzi et al., 2013), found partial support for
the correspondence theory; observers had to chose their preferred
color-form combination, similar to Kandinsky’s questionnaire.
The authors report a strong association between a triangle and
yellow, some evidence for red being associated with a square, but
there was no support for the blue-circle combination.
It seems likely that Kandinsky’s correspondence theory was
influenced by his theorizing, or perhaps indirectly by his
synesthesia, and was then spread by subsequent Bauhaus liter-
ature and promotion. It seems unlikely that these color-shape
associations reflect a common property of all human brains, akin
to sub-threshold synesthesia, or that they are an aesthetic uni-
versal. Our null results are important because it is likely that
people will continue seeking empirical evidence for Kandinsky’s
correspondence theory, given the current popularity of empirical
aesthetics.
Despite our conclusive negative findings, many associations
involving color exist in the human brain, some of which may
have an ecological basis. For example, Palmer and Schloss (2010)
describe evidence that color preferences arise from associations
with pleasant and unpleasant objects (e.g., clear blue sky vs.
brown feces or rotting food). More generally, it is well-known
that statistical properties of the environment (such as a common
motion direction for objects and sound sources) are reflected
in the neural mechanisms that combine stimuli from different
modalities (e.g., Meyer andWuerger, 2001; Harrison et al., 2011),
and that the typical color of objects complements perception,
so that, for example, gray bananas still appear slightly yellow
(Hansen et al., 2006). However, evidence for apparently mean-
ingless, quasi-synesthetic, color-form associations of the type
proposed by Kandinsky remains limited.
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